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Welch: Constitutional Law - Press Has No Constitutional Right to Attend

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

PRESS HAS NO

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ATTEND A PRETRIAL
SUPPRESSION HEARING-Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368 (1979).
INTRODUCTION

American courts have struggled continuously with balancing
the defendant's right to a fair trial' with the reporter's right of
freedom of the press.2 The courts face a most difficult challenge
when confronted with a highly publicized case because they may
have to exclude the public and the press from any pretrial hearings
to ensure defendant's right to a fair trial under the sixth amendment.3 The Supreme Court of the United States considered the
constitutional ramification of judicial pretrial closure orders" in
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale.5 In a five-four decision the Supreme
Court held the sixth amendment's public trial guarantee did not
give the press and public any right of access to pretrial suppression
hearings since the public trial guarantee was for the benefit of the
1. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district

wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST.

aqiend. VI.

2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.' amend. I; Erickson, Fair Trial
and Free Press: The Practical Dilemma, 29 STAN. L. REV. 485 (1977).
3. Supra note 1.
4. See generally J. NOWAK, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL
(1978); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-11 (1978).

LAW,

762-67

5. 443 U.S. 368 (1979). The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held the exclusionary order to be a violation of petitioner's first amendment rights due to an
insufficient amount of potential prejudice. 55 A.D.2d 107, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1976)
(per curiam), vacated the order and appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals did
not reverse but modified. Constitutional question was rendered moot. 43 N.Y.2d
370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977), cert. granted, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
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defendant alone.' The majority in Gannett stated that the protection of defendant's right to a fair trial by avoiding prejudicial pretrial publicity outweighed the press' right of access to pretrial proceeding and, as a result, concluded that closure of a suppression
hearing did not violate any first amendment right of access by the
press and the public.7 The Gannett Court concluded that neither
the sixth amendment nor the first amendment requires that the
press and public be granted access to a pretrial suppression
hearing.
THE CASE

Gannett Company, owner of two Rochester, New York, newspapers, published a series of articles of the alleged killing of an expoliceman by two youths. The investigation and apprehension of
the two defendants received extensive local publicity. Alleging that
they had made confessions to the police, the two defendants
moved to suppress these statements as involuntary confessions. In
a state prosecution for murder, robbery and grand larceny, Judge
DePasquale, at a pretrial hearing on the motion to suppress,
granted defendants' request to exclude the public and the press.
The unabated accumulation of adverse publicity had jeopardized
defendants' ability to receive a fair trial. Both the district attorney
and Gannett's reporters were present at the hearing, and neither
objected to the exclusionary order.
Gannett Company commenced an original proceeding in the
nature of prohibition and mandamus challenging the closure orders
on first, sixth and fourteenth amendment grounds. The appellate
division vacated the trial court's orders; the exclusionary order
transgressed the public's vital interest in open judicial proceedings
and constituted an unlawful prior restraint in violation of the first
and fourteenth amendments.8 The New York Court of Appeals
modified this judgment by holding that the danger posed to defendants' ability to receive a fair trial overcame the presumption that
criminal trials are open to the public.9 The Court of Appeals upheld the exclusionary order. Noting the significant constitutional
questions, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.10
6. 443 U.S. 368, 379 (1979).
7. Id. at 392-93.
8. Supra note 5.

9. Id.
10. 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
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Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Gannett, held that
the public had no constitutional right under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to attend a criminal trial,11 and any first and
right of the press to attend a criminal trial
fourteenth amendment
2
was not violated.1
BACKGROUND

The United States Supreme Court traditionally has recognized
that adverse publicity can endanger the ability of a defendant to
receive a fair trial." In Sheppard v. Maxwell1 4 the Supreme Court
held that the failure of a state trial judge in a murder prosecution
to protect defendant from inherently prejudicial publicity which
saturated the community deprived defendant of a fair trial consistent with due process. The trial judge had an affirmative constitutional duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial
15
publicity.
Numerous courts have attempted to prevent the dissemination
of such prejudicial information by the use of "gag orders."' 6 In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart 7 a state trial judge, in a multi11. 443 U.S. 368, 391 (1979).
12. Id. at 393.
13. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (trial did not meet constitutional
standard of impartiality where the members of the jury on voir dire expressed
their opinion as to defendant's guilt of a crime which had been extensively publicized by newspapers, radio and television); cf. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965)
(defendant was deprived of his right to due process under the fourteenth amendment by the televising of his notorious, heavily publicized criminal trial).
14. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
15. Id. at 363.
16. A "gag order" is an order placed on the press prohibiting publication of
matters prejudicial to the defendant in the form of a prior restraint. See TimesPicayune Publishing Co. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301 (1974) (application
granted for stay of an order of the Louisiana Criminal District Court restricting
media coverage of the trials of two defendants accused of committing a highly
publicized rape and murder). United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.
1972) (hearing held for nonjury determination of whether or not elected state officials had "trumped-up" charges against individuals solely because of race and
civil rights activities; the district court's order absolutely prohibiting two reporters from reporting any details of evidence violated their right of free press). Cf.
United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 867
(1969) (order forbidding out-of-court discussion of case prior to defendant's trial
for federal offenses did not violate defendant's rights of free speech guaranteed by
first amendment).
17. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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ple murder case which had attracted widespread news coverage,
entered an order restraining the news media from publishing the
accounts of confessions made by defendant to law-enforcement officers. The Supreme Court held that while the guarantee of freedom of expression is not an absolute right under all circumstances,
the barriers to prior restraint remain high, and the presumption
against its use continues intact. 8 Although Nebraska Press raised
a presumption against gag orders, 9 it failed to address the issue of
closure of pretrial suppression hearings.
The Supreme Court prior to Gannett had not defined clearly
the precise constitutional restraints applicable to closure orders;
however, the Supreme Court, along with various other appellate
courts, had addressed three primary issues surrounding this area of
law: (1) whether or not the sixth amendment guarantee to a public
trial was merely for the defendant alone, (2) whether or not the
defendant had an absolute right to compel a private trial and (3)
whether or not the Constitution granted the press special access to
information not shared by members of the public generally.
Whether or not the sixth amendment is personal to the accused was addressed in In re Oliver.20 The Supreme Court recognized that an accused's guarantee of a "public trial" was a safeguard against any attempt to employ courts as instruments of
persecution. 2 Knowledge that every criminal trial was subject to
contemporaneous review in the form of public opinion was an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial discretion. 22 Considering the same issue, the Supreme Court in Estes v. Texas23 held
that the televising of a notorious, heavily publicized criminal trial
deprived defendant of his right to due process under the fourteenth amdndment. 2' The Supreme Court felt that the purpose of
the sixth amendment, applicable to states through the fourteenth,
was to guarantee fair treatment to the accused. 5
Both Oliver and Estes indicate that the constitutional guaran18. Id. at 561.
19. Note, The Gag Order, Exclusion and the Press's Right to Information,
39 ALB. L. REV. 317 (1974-75); Comment, Gagging the Press in Criminal Trials,
10 HARV. Civ. RTS.-Cv. LIB. L. REV. 608 (1975).
20. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
21. Supra note 1.

22. 333 U.S. 257, 271-72 (1948).
23. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
24. Id. at 535.

25. Id. at 538-39.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol2/iss1/12
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tee of a public trial was for the benefit of the defendant alone.
Despite the precedential value of these two cases, numerous appellate courts have held contra.2 6 For example, the Second Circuit, on
a motion to suppress drugs seized as part of an airport terminal
check, held in United States v. Clark2 7 that exclusion of the public
from the entire hearing was an error of constitutional magnitude in
violation of defendant's sixth amendment right.2 8 The Clark court
stressed the importance of providing the public an opportunity to
observe judicial proceedings and to question the conduct of enforcement officials.29
Likewise, in considering the issue of whether or not the public
trial guarantee was for the benefit of the defendant alone, the Supreme Court of North Carolina concluded in In re Edens"0 that the
trial and disposition of criminal cases was the public's business and
ought to be conducted publicly in open court.8 The judge in
Edens improperly precluded the district attorney from participating in the disposition of the criminal case. The disposition outside
the courtroom when court was not in session had removed the pro2
ceeding improperly from the public domain.1
The Third Circuit considered the second issue of whether or
not defendant had an absolute right to compel a private trial in
3 and found a presumption existed that
United States v. Cianfranis
all adjudicative proceedings are open to the public as part of the
due process provision of the fifth amendment and the public trial
provision of the sixth amendment. The Cianfrani Court said that
the public trial provision reflected the traditional Anglo-American
distrust for secret trials. Where decisions crucial to the outcome of
the entire criminal case were made at pretrial suppression hearings, policies in support of an open trial requirement applied with
full force: (1) the need to make trial accessible to unknown parties
26. See United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 968 (1978) (held that a trial is a public event and members of the media
thus are free to report whatever occurs in open court).
27. 475 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1973).
28. Id. at 246.
29. Id. at 246-47.
30. 290 N.C. 299, 226 S.E.2d 5 (1976).
31. Id. at 306, 226 S.E.2d 5, 9; see N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18. Raper v. Berrier,
246 N.C. 193, 195, 97 S.E.2d 782, 784 (1957) (the public and especially the parties
are entitled to see and hear what happens in courts).
32. 290 N.C. 299, 266 S.E.2d 5, 10 (1976).
33. 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1978).
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who have legal interest in the case, (2) the need to subject the judiciary to public scrutiny and (3) the need to provide the appearance
of justice in order to foster confidence in the judicial system. 4
Cianfrani noted that, while defendant might waive his right to attack his conviction on grounds that he was denied a public trial,
defendant had no absolute right to compel a private trial.3 5
The third related issue was whether or not the Constitution
granted the press special access to information not shared by members of the public generally." The Supreme Court in Pelt v.
7
Procunierupheld a prison regulation under which media representatives, although able to interview inmates, were unable to select a particular inmate. The first and fourteenth amendments
barred government interference with free press, but the Constitution did not require the government to accord press special access
38

to information.

Prior to Gannett a state's imposition of sanctions on the reporting of events transpiring in pretrial suppression hearings was
clearly unconstitutional. 9 The courts began to close these hearings
to ensure that the press and the public would not disseminate information prejudicial to the defendant before the trial.'0 Pretrial
suppression hearings posed special risks of unfairness particularly
when the proceedings involved involuntary confessions 4 1 as in
Gannett. In Jackson v. Denno42 the Supreme Court stated that
basing a conviction, in whole or in part, on an involuntary confession deprived defendant in a criminal case of due process of law.' 3
Defendant had a constitutional right to have a fair hearing and
reliable determination on the issue of voluntariness." The essence
of pretrial suppression hearings was to ensure that unreliable or
illegally obtained evidence did not become known to the jury.
34. Id. at 850.
35. Id. at 852.
36. Comment, Newsgathering: Second Class Right Among First Amendment
Freedoms, 53 TEx. L. REV. 1440 (1975); Comment, The Right of the Press to
Gather Information After Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 166 (1975).
37. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
38. Id. at 834.
39. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-11 (1978).
40. Id.
41. Comment, Fair Trial and Free Press: PreliminaryHearing-Gateway to
Prejudice, 1973 LAW AND Soc. ORD. 903.
42. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
43. Id. at 376.
44. Id. at 376-77.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol2/iss1/12
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Whether or not closure of these proceedings may violate constitutional safeguards was the precise question that faced the Supreme
Court in Gannett.
ANALYSIS

From this background the Supreme Court in Gannett held
that the Constitution did not give Gannett Company an affirmative right of access to the pretrial proceeding when all the participants in the litigation agreed it should be closed to protect the
fair-trial rights of the defendants.4 5 To safeguard the due process
rights of the accused, a trial judge has an affirmative constitutional
duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity.4 6 Because of the Constitution's concern for these due process rights, a
trial judge may take protective measures even when they are not
strictly and inescapably necessary.4 7 The Gannett Court recognized the danger of publicity concerning pretrial suppression hearings which influences public opinion against a defendant and informs potential jurors of inculpatory information wholly
inadmissible at trial. 48 The Court noted that the closure of pretrial
proceedings is often one of the most effective methods that a trial
judge can employ to attempt to ensure that the dissemination of
unreliable information throughout the community will not jeopard49
ize the fairness of a trial.
The Gannett majority opinion reviewed the Oliver" and Estes5 1 treatment of the sixth amendment's guarantee of a public
trial and concluded that the public trial guarantee was solely for
the benefit of defendant. 52 The Supreme Court, citing Singer v.
United States,53 held that while the sixth amendment guaranteed
to a defendant in a criminal case the right to a public trial, it did
not guarantee the right to compel a private trial. The court distinguished the defendant's right to a public trial from the real issue at
hand: "whether members of the public have an enforceable right to
a public trial that can be asserted independently of the parties in
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

443 U.S. 368, 379 (1979).
384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979).
Id. at 378-79.
Id.at 379.
Supra note 20.
Supra note 23.
443 U.S. 368, 381 (1979).
380 U.S. 24 (1965).
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the litigation." '4 I The majority recognized an independent public
interest in the enforcement of the sixth amendment public trial
guarantee. The adversary system of criminal justice is premised on
the proposition that the participants in the litigation fully protect
the public interest; however, the Supreme Court did not feel that
this independent public interest should be interpreted to create a
constitutional right on the part of the public.58
The Supreme Court turned to the history of the public trial
guarantee and found that it ultimately revealed no more than the
existence of a common-law rule of open civil and criminal proceedings. Even if the sixth and the fourteenth amendments properly
could be viewed as embodying the common-law right of the public
to attend criminal trials, no persuasive evidence existed that at
common law members of the public had any right to attend pretrial proceedings; in fact, the Court found substantial evidence to
the contrary: 56 by the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
public trials clearly were associated with the protection of the
57
defendant.
Pretrial proceedings, precisely because of the same concern for
a fair trial, were never characterized by the same degree of openness as were actual trials." The Court noted that closed pretrial
hearings were a familiar part of American judicial history. The
original New York Code of Criminal Procedure published in 1850
provided that pretrial hearings should be closed to the public on
request of defendant.5 9 From this historical analysis, the majority
concluded that members of the public have no constitutional right
under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to attend criminal
trials.60
The Court finally considered any right of access to pretrial
hearings the petitioner might have had under the first and fourteenth amendments. The Court felt that the state nisi prius court
appropriately deferred this putative right by finding that representatives of the press did have a right of access of constitutional
dimension but holding, under the circumstances of this case, that
the defendants' rights to a fair trial outweighed any first amend54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979).
Id.
Id. at 387.
Id.
Id. at 387-88.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 391.
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ment right of the press."1 Thus the majority based the closure decision "on an assessment of competing societal interests rather than
on any determination that first amendment freedoms were not
implicated." 2
Chief Justice Burger in his concurring opinion felt that the
majority should have stressed the nature of the proceeding. A motion before trial to suppress evidence is not a trial but a pretrial
hearing.6 8 From a historical viewpoint, the draftsmen of the Constitution could not anticipate the twentieth-century pretrial proceedings to suppress evidence, but pretrial proceedings were not
wholly unknown. Thus the drafters of the sixth amendment must
have been aware that some testimony was likely to be recorded
before trials took place. In Burger's opinion, a pretrial deposition
did not become part of a "trial" for sixth amendment purposes until and unless the contents of the deposition were offered in
evidence.4
Justice Powell in his concurring opinion stressed that the Supreme Court should identify for the guidance of trial courts the
constitutional standard by which lower courts are to judge whether
or not closure is justified and the minimal procedure by which this
standard is to be applied.65 Powell suggested that:
The question for the trial court, therefore, in considering a motion to close a pretrial suppression hearing is whether a fair trial
for the defendant is likely to be jeopardized by publicity, if members of the press and public are present and free to report prejudicial evidence that will not be presented to the jury.66
Contrary to Justice Rehnquist, Powell believes that lower courts
cannot assume after the decision that they are free to determine
for themselves the question whether to open or close the proceed7
ing free from all constitutional constraint.
Justice Rehnquist stated in his concurring opinion that the
lower courts are under no constitutional constraint either to accept
or reject the procedure employed by the trial court in this case or
61. Id. at 393.
62. Id. (citing Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 860 (1974), Powell, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 394.
64. Id. at 396.
65. Id. at 398.
66. Id. at 400.
67. Id. at 398 n.2.
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those advanced by Powell in order to avoid running afoul of the
first amendment.6 8 They remain free to determine for themselves
the question whether to open or close the proceeding.6 9
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, White and Marshall joined in
dissent. They felt that the Gannett decision ignored important
precedents and significant developmental features of the sixth
amendment.70 The rule of the case as they saw it is that if the
defense and the prosecution merely agree to have the public excluded from a suppression hearing, and the trial judge does not
resist, closure shall take place; nothing in the sixth amendment
prevents it.71 The precise issue in the dissenting opinion was

whether, or to what extent, the Constitution prohibits the states
from excluding, at defendant's request, members of the public
from such a hearing.72 The dissent argued that the public trial
guarantee of the sixth amendment ensures that not only judges but
all participants in the criminal justice system are subjected to public scrutiny as they conduct the public's business of prosecuting
crime.7 3 The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that in criminal cases the states act in conformity with the
public trial provision of the sixth amendment.74 Thus the fact that
the sixth amendment casts the right to a public trial in terms of
the right of the accused is not sufficient to permit the inference
that the accused may compel a private proceeding simply by waiving that right.73 Any such right to compel a private proceeding
must have some independent basis in the sixth amendment, which
may be determined by examining the common law and colonial
antecedents of the public trial provision. The dissent, in its perception of the historical development of the sixth amendment, found
no evidence of a right to a private proceeding or a power to compel
a private trial arising out of the ability to waive the grant of a
68. Id. at 405.
69. Id. n.2. (Justice Powell was the only justice to recognize a first amendment right of access. The remaining justices making up the majority did not recognize either a sixth amendment or a first amendment right of access. The dissent
recognized a sixth amendment but not a first amendment right of access.)
70. Id. at 406.
71. Id. at 406-07.
72. Id. at 411.
73. Id. at 412; see N.C. CONST. art. I, §§ 18, 24.
74. Id. at 414-15; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968);
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 28 (1972).
75. 443 U.S. 368, 418 (1979).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol2/iss1/12
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public one.7 6 Thus, the dissent concluded that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, insofar as it incorporates the
public trial provision of the sixth amendment, prohibits the states
from excluding the public from a proceeding within the ambit of
the sixth amendment's guarantee without affording full and fair
consideration to the public's interests in maintaining an open
proceeding. 7
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Gannett held that the press and the
public have no independent constitutional right under the sixth
amendment to access to a pretrial judicial proceeding, and any first
amendment right of access by the press and public was deferred
appropriately by the state nisi prius court. The Gannett Court,
however, failed to give any specific standards to be followed when
determining if a suppression hearing is to be closed. Instead, it left
the decision whether or not to exclude the press and public to the
discretion of the trial judges. The lower courts are to engage in a
balancing test by weighing defendant's constitutional right to a fair
trial against any first amendment rights of the press and the public. The trial judge has an affirmative constitutional duty to minimize prejudicial pretrial publicity, and he may take protective
measures even when they are not strictly necessary. When the danger to defendant is no longer present, the judge shall not deny the
press and the public access to the hearing.
Whether the trial judge's decision derived from the balancing
test is free from any constitutional restraint was not addressed
specifically in Stewart's majority opinion. Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist expressed opposing viewpoints in their separate
concurring opinions. Justice Powell stated that the lower courts are
not free from constitutional restraint; whereas, Justice Rehnquist
stated that they were. Thus the Supreme Court left this point to
be decided at a later date.
Another point left in a state of confusion is whether or not the
Gannett holding shall be limited to pretrial judicial proceedings.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stressed several times
that the Gannett holding shall be limited as such, but one court
has noted that Gannett is susceptible of several possible interpre76. Id. at 427.
77. Id. at 432-33.
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tations. 7s The press argues that Gannett's effect will cripple its
ability to report the news. 79 Developing case law will require the
Court to provide a definitive answer to this question in the near
future.
Jay C. Welch

78. See Keene Publishing Corp. v. Cheshire County Superior Court,
-N.H.-, 406 A.2d 137 (1979) (New Hampshire State Supreme Court noted the
existence of several possible interpretations of Gannett).
79. 94 NEWSWEEK, July 16, 1979, at 60; 114 TIME July 16, 1979, at 66.
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